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International Trade and Uneven Development*
by
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Introduction
In his article "Group Behavior and International Trade," Kindleberger
traced the effect of the fall in the world price of wheat after 1870 on the
trade and production of several European countries. 1

He found that England,

the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark followed the classical economic model
by allowing imports of wheat to substitute for domestic production.

Germany,

France and Italy, however, raised tariffs to counter the effect of the change
in the terms of trade.

Because of this difference in response, Kindleberger

concluded that it was necessary to analyze group behavior, i.e., class
struggle and alliance, in predicting how an economy reacts to changes in
price or other economic variables.

"For accurate prediction and policy-for

mation, an adequate theory of the behavior of large groups and their com
ponents is needed as an adjunct to the analytical tools of the market. 112 In
technical terms, the usual economic model of international trade is misspeci
fied since it deals only with market relations and omits important social and
political equations.
tions.

It therefore yields biased estimates and wrong predic

The model, for example, takes into account the effect of tariffs on

the distribution of income, but not the feedback of a change in income dis
tribution (real or threatened) on the setting of tariffs.
More recently, Harry Johnson has also stressed the importance of the
missing political equations in international trade theory. 3
*To appear in Kindleberger Festschrift.

In his
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theoretical model of economic nationalism, he argued that many countries
have a preference for industry over agriculture, government ownership over
private ownership, national ownership over foreign, and import substitution
over export expansion.

These preferences determine a pattern of behavior

quite different from that predicted by international trade theory.

Instead

of choosing the point on the production possibilities curve that maximizes
the value of output at world prices (i.e., a point where the marginal rate
of transformation equals the international price ratio), they use tariffs,
subsidies, and other instruments to bias production away from Pareto Optim
ality and to satisfy their given "non economic" preferences, e.g., they
sacrifice real income in order to increase the share of manufacturing in
national production or the share of nationals in the ownership of the capital
stock.
In a similar vein, our recent analysis of government expenditure policy
in underdeveloped countries stressed the importance of explicitly introducing
4
g:r,rernmcnt utility functions and tax equation into economic analysis.

We

argued that the go,,ernment is the main provider of a large portion of the
capitnl stock of a country (both physical and human) as well as the sole
provider of certain essential support services.

Since the government does

n3t usually use market criteria for its production and pricing decisions,

the observed level of production and consumption in an economy will depend
not only on private tastes, technologies, and factor endowments, as theory
su-::::::;ests, but also on the preferences and decision rules used by the govern
ment, i.e., on political as well as economic equations.
Given theGe considerations, our goal in this paper is to analyze the
his·::oric origins of underdevelopment using a framework which includes

-

political as ·well as economic factors.
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Our purpose is to explain why the

growth of the international economy over the course of the last few centuries
has failed to equalize factor prices but instead has created a dualism be
tween the developed and underdeveloped areas of the world.
Among other things, we want to show the frail base upon which rest so
many of the orthodox economists' policy recommendations for development.
Since international trade theory tells only a portion of the story of the
gains and losses from trade, it is seriously misleading when used by it
self in empirical analysis and policy prescription.

As the following simple

econometric model of supply response demonstrates, the cost of ignoring
political factors is an inability to identify economic relations and,
therefore, an inability to make policy recommendations.
Equation (1) describes the usual economic supply function.

Equation

(2) is a political equation relating government policy to world price.

where:

xt is exports in real terms, Pt is the world price, tt is the net

tax rate, i.e., taxes less subsidies including expenditures on infrastruc
ture, and uit is the error terms of the i th equation.
Solving these equations yields the reduced form (3):
3,

Xt = a 1 + bl (1 - a 2 ) Pt - b 1 b 2P,E ·- blPtu 2t + ult
2

=al+ BlPt + B2Pt + Ut
The first problem encountered in any attempt to evaluate the parameters
of supply response in this model, is the difficulty of obtaining data on t.
One can sometimes measure tariffs and taxes accurately but it is almost
never possible to estimate other government instruments, e.g., the value of
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subsidies contained in the wide variety of services offered by the govern
ment to the private sector at reduced prices.

Where.!:_ cannot be measured,

one cannot estimate the structural equations of the model, but must confine
the analysis to the reduced form.

This is not adequate for policy.

To

formulate policy [i.e., to decide how best to alter the decision rule im
plied by equation (2)], a government must know the value of b 1 and cannot
rely merely on the reduced form estimates, B1 and B2 , so long as b 2 is not

small.
Thus the question of whether "power" relationships should be included

in economic models is an empirical one and not a matter of convenience or
of specialization between economists and political scientists.

Since

economists usually ignore political factors, structural estimates are not
available and policy is often hampered severely.

Empirical work on input/

output tables provides an important example of information based only on
reduced form estimates.

The coefficients of these tables, so frequently

used by planners, are derived from the actual flows in a given year and
do not reflect technological linkages alone, as they purport to, but
also the tastes, interests and limitations of the previous governments'
decision rules.

Thus there are good econometric reasons for a government

interested in overcoming underdevelopme nt, i.e., changing policy and
structure, to be wary of them.
This model also points to another important problem for policy-making
even where accurate estimates oft are available.

Suppose that a previous

government had been characterized by a decision rule which attempted to
stabilize price to producers by varying.!:_ inversely to P
a Marketing Board).

(e.g., through

This would reduce the observed variance of P(l - t)
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and increase the difficulty of estimating the coefficients of equation (1)
thus making it difficult to use past experience as a basis for future
policy.

More generally, when a government attempts to change the structure

of an economy (i.e., develop), it often finds the data generated by the
previous structure (i.e., the historical facts) to be unhelpful as a basis
for policy.

Revolution, by definition, implies values of a's and b's

outside the historical sample, and only under very special conditions would
the statistical estimates of those coefficients apply to non-marginal
changes.

Ideology supplies the strength to ignore the facts.

One of the

important purposes of historical analysis is to show how power relations in
the past constrained the full development of the productive potential of
the economy.
The essay is divided into three parts corresponding to the three major
stages of the international economy:

Mercantilism (late 15th to 19th century),

Colonialism (1870·-1939) and The Present.

For convenience we call these

Mercantilism I, Mercantilism II and Mercantilism III, since they represent
successive stages of unequal trade and uneven development.

The argument is

conducted heuristically, but our hope is to proceed at a later point to
theoretical and econometric models using sets of interdependent political
and economic equations.
Mercantilism I:

15th Century to 1870

The Mercantilist period created the first truly international economy.
The oceans were transformed from a barrier separating Europe from Asia,
1-\merica and Africa, to a medium of exchange and new dimensions for commer
cial intercourse were opened up.

Ironically, the global integration which

created~ world, unified by mercantile and political relationships, also

-

6 -

led to the fragmentation of its parts into a small set of developing coun
tries and a large group of stunted and deformed economies which became the
underdeveloped areas of the world.

It is this historical process of uneven

development which we will focus upon in the following analysis.
International trade theory 5 predicts that in a market system the fall
in transport costs created by the age of exploration would lead to an in
crease in trade and improved welfare for the world as a whole as well as
for each of its trading countries.

Individuals and groups within a coun

try may, of course, gain or lose depending on their ownership of factors
of production.

In an egalitarian peasant economy for example, all indivi

duals will be better off since they share equally in the resources of the
country.

In a more highly developed civilization such as existed in parts

of Asia and South America, labor should lose and land gain since imported
manufactures would substitute for crafts and services while increased ex
ports of primary products would raise the value of natural resources.
Our model yields different results because it takes into account
political as well as market relationships.

Mercantilist trade changed

the power structure within and between countries and this radical break
is of greater importance in explaining the patterns of trade and income
distribution than is the market reaction to price focused upon in the
orthodox model.
Figure 1 is a device to illustrate the employment structure of the
traditional economy and the changes that occurred as a result of
Mercantilsm I trade.

The diagram is based on an equation linking food

production (and consumption) per capita!_ to:

output per man-hour in

agriculture a, hours per man in agriculture E_, and the percentage of
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persons engaged in agriculture n.
4.

f = ahn

For a given per capita food standard, Equation (4) traces out a rectangular
hyperbola, AA, describing possible distributions of the work force of a
traditional society.

It is assumed that a is unaffected by hand n. 6

I

At a

A

t-1

I

'i';l;_
lN

A6 Ri(' u l TV A. E

FIGURE 1
point such as A (which we shall argue represents one of the prevalent
1
African modes of production) nearly the entire population is engaged in
the agrarian sector (n approaches 1), but the hours worked per man in agri
culture are low.

At a point such as A2 (Oriental Despotism), a much larger

fraction of the population is outside the agrarian sector, while those
engaged in agriculture are more fully specialized and work substantially
longer hours in farming in order to produce an agricultural surplus for
the remainder of the population.

-
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The distribut ion of time in non-agric ultural activitie s can be illus
trated in Figure 1 by dropping perpendic ulars to each axis.

The vertical

distance between the total hours of labor per worker hand the actual
hours worked in agricultu re per worker

E.

represent s the time available

in t.½e agrarian sector for the productio n of household goods and services
7
which we have labeled Z goods in a previous paper, z1 = (h - h)n.
The horizonta l distance between the total populatio n

C!:

= 1) and

that fraction engaged in agricultu re~ represent s the proportio n engaged
in what the Physiocra ts called the unproduc tive sector, i.e., the a:i:.isto
crats, soldiers, servants, officers, clerks, traders and artisans associ
ated with the state sector, z2 = h(l -· n).
The African case w·as_ character ized by a small state sector because
its egalitari an political structure inhibited the appropria tion of the

surplus by a small group.

Most families had full rights to land and paid

little, if anything, in the way of rents or taxes either in kind or in
labor services.

The fraction z2 was, thus, very small (in many cases even

the chief's family grew its own food) while the portion of time spent on
8
Z1 was la~ge, much of it was devoted to leisure and ceremony.
An opposite pattern is found in the Asian case.
power of the state to extract a surplus,

z2

Because of the great

is large and

z1

is small.

A

large number of people are engaged in extractin g the surplus from agri
cultural workers, managing the affairs of the bureaucra cy, and providing
consumpti on goods and services for the state.

In order to meet their

taxes, the agricultu ral populatio n must reduce their consu.rnpti on ~f z1 and
devote their time to producing an agricultu ral surplus.

In addition, the

requireme nts of corvee further reduce the time available for household
productio n.

9 -
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In the diagram, as we have drawn it, the standard of life for the
majority of the population is clearly superior in the African case.

Food

consumption per capita is the same in both cases by assumption, while z1
is much greater in Africa than in Asia.

This result depends crucially on

the assumption that AA is a rectangular hyperbola.

In rea.li ty there are

several reasons for believing that agricultural labor productivity associated with the Asian mode differs from that found in Africa.

The advanced

civilization associated with Oriental Despotism was based on a hydraulic
society which implied investment of resources in irrigation and other infra
structure to increase agricultural output. ,If

~

was sufficiently higher as a re

sult of this investment, it would be possible then for h (hours

per

worker in agriculture) to be the same in both cases even t.hough the Asian
mode had a larger z2 .

This would have happened if the state in practice

charged a tithe exactly equal to its social productivity so that the agri
cultural population did not suffer because of its existence.
historical reason to believe this was the case.

There is no

Studies of Oriental Des-

potism suggest that the state attempted to maximize the surplus and to
reduce income in the agricultural sector to the minimum necessary for sur
9
vival, and sometimes not even that.

Moreover, some of the government

infrastructure was needed merely to compensate for diminishing returns
resulting from the use of a higher labor/land ratio. 10
The revolutionary impact of the new trading possibilities introduced
by Mercantilism I led to the growth of the state in certain African econ
omies and to a movement towards the Asian mode; \-rhile in certain Asian
economies it led to a decline in state power and a movement away from
their original position.

This movement is shown by the arrows in Figure 1.

·- 10

~

In both cases, there is a dramatic change in the composition of output and
its distribution even though national income did not necessarily increase
and in some cases fell.
In the African case, the new opportunities for foreign trade provided
both an incentive and the means for the growth of a state sector.

Economic

factors were not the sole cause of state formation but were an important
contributing factor.

A military group which succeeded in monopolizing co

ercive power in a given area could establish peace and security for traders,
and levy taxes accordingly.
tariffs for banditry.

The state, in a word, substituted tolls and

The larger the area brought under control, the

greater the taxes that could be charged, and the more powerful a military
and bureaucratic establishment that could be supported.

The strength of

the state could also be used to capture slaves, to organize slave production
of exportables (in gold mining for example) or to meet food requirements.
It was thus possible to expropriate a surplus through exploitation of labor
as well as through taxation of trade.
The impact of Mercantilism I on income in Africa and its distribution
was very complex.

The local elites benefited, as did both the plantation

owners in the new world and the merchants who organized the elaborate mer
cantile system based on the slave trade.

To the e,{tent that it partici

pated in the upsurge of economic activity on a voluntary basis a certain
portion of the population at large also benefited by trading food or manu
factures for imported goods.

Nonetheless, gains were in no way commensurate

with the enormous dead weight loss associated with the capture of slaves
and their exploitation in plantations.

As regards Africa, therefore, the

production possibilities of society shifted inward due to those losses
from trade.

Amongst those who remained, there was a reallocation of labor
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into

z2

due to the growth of the state (it is assume d that

z2

includ es

import ed
planta tion produc tion) and out of z1 as free men substi tuted
ment resem
goods for domes tic manuf acture s. The distri butio n of employ
n of in
bled more closel y that of the Asian societ y but the distri butio
The standa rd of life of

come among the living was quite differ ent.

rd of
slaves were repres sed belm,, the preced ing levels , but the standa
s was com·
life of free men was increa sed becaus e their marke ted surplu
h taxes.
pensat ed by import ed goods rather than simply taken away throug
of
In the Asian case the co~ing of the Hest led to the underm ining
the Asiati c
the power struct ure in countr ies or region s charac terize d by
mode of produ ction.

The steady penet ration of Wester n trader s from the

nship s
16th centur y onward s eroded the politi cal and econom ic relatio
In terms of Figure 1, there was a declin e in

based on Orien tal Despo tism.

z2

and an increa se in

state.

z1

as labor was freed from activi ties servin g the

Africa n
Thus the Asian mode moved somew hat in the direct ion of the

increa sed.
as the influe nce of the state declin ed and that of the West
improv ement in
The impact of Merca htilism I trade thus at first led to an
welfar e as the declin e of

z2

and rise in

of the long explo ited peasan t.

z1

distri buted income in favor

The declin e of Orien tal Despo tism with its

labor meant
unprod uctive class of retain ers and its demand s for corvee
contra ry to the
that the wage- rental ratio for the societ y as a whole rose
predic tions of the classi cal model.
of com
In some areas a new z 2 a.rose in conne ction with the expans ion
the histor ical
merci al activi ty as new tradin g routes to the West replac ed
trade among China, India, and South east Asia.

The flouri shing of this

the growth of
trade during the 17th and espec ially the 18th centur y led to
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Western controlled coastal regions and port areas and the demand for a food
surplus to service traders, soldiers and consuls.

In these areas, z

2

(the

new sector specializin g in commercial activity) rose while z1 declined, re
placed by imported manufacture s, as the hinterland specialized in food or
export production.
Through time, the West pushed steadily inward and established a new
system of political control.

The tendency to improve welfare increasingl y

came under pressure as the West increased its ability to control the indi
genous work force, to enforce tribute, and to levy taxes.

A.s

the West's

ability to extract a surplus grew , the share of the gains from trade going
to the vast majority of the population declined and only a small class of
foreign traders and rulers ,or, in some regions, local elites benefited
substantial ly.

The peasant, freed from Oriental Despotism, found himself

increasingl y bound to a new master, and there was once again a tendency
for z

2

(including plantation labor) to rise and z1 to fall.

The Western impact in Latin America (Mexico and Peru) was different
in that the existing political structure was quickly taken over and the
population exploited at a maximal rate.

So ruthless was the appropriati on

of the surplus in gold and silver mining that a large percentage of the
population soon died.

The complex pattern of Western rule and coloniza

tion which existed in Asia was, therefore, not duplicated in Latin America.
There was a total collapse of society and enormous losses from trade.
Our models of trade in Mercantilism I have emphasized shifts in the
power structures rather than movements along production possibiliti es
curve and have yielded quite different predictions about changes in produc
tion, employment, and distributio n of income than those of internation al
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trade theory.

our analysis can be summarized in the following simple balance

equation of the Gains and Losses from Trade (providing one is willing to
accept, for the sake of argument, the measurability of changes in welfare):
Gains to Elite
in Europe

Gains (or Losses) to
Majority in Europe

+

Gains to Elite
in Underdevel
oped Countries

+

Losses of Ex
ploited

=

Gains from
Trade

Deadweight
-· Loss

The crucial feature of Mercantilism I is that the overall gains from
trade were small and the deadweight loss was large.

It is hard to imagine

any reasonable set of calculations which would show that the value of the
increase in world income during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries could
offset the tremendous costs associated with the murder and enslavement of
Africans and Americans.

This is true even if one were to argue that there

was a net gain in welfare for those Asian countries in which the population
11
was freed from Oriental Despotisrn.

Many of the gains accruing to the

elites in the underdeveloped world and Europe (and possibly to workers in
Europe) arose mainly from the shifts in power and increased exploitation
rather than from increased productivity.

This slash and burn capitalism

was possible only because Mercantilism I was able to use the human capital
accumulated over previous centuries and did not worry about maintaining
its reproduction.
If Mercantilism I caused an inward shift in the production possibil
ities curve in parts of Africa and America, it also caused an outward
shift in Europe.

Again, changes in the distribution of income and power

were the crucial factors.

It is not necessary to postulate that Europe

as a whole (or even England as a whole) gained from Mercantilism I to ex-

plain the phenomenal rise in savings, investment, and income in the 19th cen
The important feature is that some groups benefited and that a new

tury.

In other words, in place of

class was formed out of the gains from trade.

the usual neoclassical formulation for investment (I= sY) we would substi
tute the equation (I'= s'Yc) where I' refers only to investment in industry
Ye refers to the income of the capitalist class ands' refers to the capital
An increase in industrial capital could then occur even

ist savings rate.

if Y fell as long as Yc/Y rose sufficiently.

Empirically, it is difficult to

estimate what happened to Y, but it is clear that Mercantilism I led to the
growth of capitalist income and power in Europe.
The steps in this process are interesting.

At first, the merchant

capitalist class had little power and was subjected to discrimination by the
feudalistic state.

However, the new possibilities of maritime commerce and

exploitation led to an alliance between the state and merchants (in some
cases pirates).

It was highly profitable for the monarch to subsidize

international trade and offer it protection because of the profits to be
gained.

Thus the state and the emerging capitalist class grew in step

though much of the increased national power was dissipated in international
rivalry.

Eventually the capitalist class became sufficiently strong to

take power and to switch government expenditure away from the agrarian sec
tor, remove agrarian preferences and protection and to increase agrarian
taxes.

This further enhanced the industrial capitalist class and led to

its further growth.

During the 19th century, industrial capital emerged

triumphant, dismantled the corn law structure and the rest of the Mercantilist
framework and created a new technology based on iron and steam and a new
set of government policies (so called laissez-faire) with which it conquered
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the world and laid the basis for the second international economy.

A total

restructuring and reorganization of the hinterland occurred in Mercantilism
II as Europe formulated a single strategic conception for the development of
the world economy and planned a new division of labor.

Many of the main-

stays of Mercantilisrn I were cast away, like the first stage of a rocket,
and new enclaves of growth were created.

Mercantilism II began as an un-

equal partnerhsip based on the asymmetrical results of Mercantilism I, and
during the course of its lifetime, it further widened the gap between Europeans
and non-Europeans.
Mercantilism II:

1870 to World War II

The period from 1870 to the 1920's was characterized by a fall in inter
national transportation costs and an increase in the variety of manufactured
goods available for trading.

Trade theory predicts these events would cause

the hinterlands of Africa, Asia, and America to expand export production and
to replace the production of home goods by imported manufactures.

The outward

shift in the production possibilities curve would imply an increase in national
income but not necessarily a corresponding improvement in welfare of every
subgroup.

The initial impact of this trade could, for example, lower wage

rates and the standards of living of large parts of the population as produc
tio~ of labor intensive home-goods declined and the production of land-inten
sive export goods increased.

Through time, however, the level of income would

be expected to rise for everyone.

Increase income would lead to increased

savings and investment, and an outward shift in the production possibilities
curve.

A rise in wages would occur as the capital/labor ratio increased.

Broadly speaking, this scenario fits a large number of countries.

It

explains the great expansion of trade, the emergence of surplus labor, the

- 16 strengthening of the landowning class, and the growth of mercantile capital
Furthermore, it also predicts the eventual investment in industry

ists.

after the 1930's, the growth of the industrial labor force, and the e:rner
gence, in the late 1960's, of manufacturing exports.

Even the attraction

of foreign investment finds support in the predictive power of the theory
because of the increased infrastructure and human capital financed by the
export economy.
'rhis scenario, however, should not be used in trade classes to illus·
trate the benefits of greater integration into the world economy because
it omits "power" equations and incorrectly identifies the structure of the
system.

The fact that so many underdeveloped countries with such diverse

backgrounds followed the pattern outlined above indicates common biases in
government policy rather than the power of the trade model.

Neoclassical

theory would predict a much greater variety of growth patterns given the
great diversity of initial conditions and is to some extent falsified by
this common experience.

We suggest that

the expansion of exports reflected

in large part the similar policies of colonial rule, while the growth of
manufacturing reflected the growing strength of the indigenous capitalist
class associated with the "national independence" movements after World War
II.

Colonial strategy squeezed the traditional economy to create an elastic

supply of labor and biased infrastructure towards exports in order to trans
fer the surplus to the center in the form of lower prices.

The specific

labor policies used conformed to no single pattern, rather a variety of de
vices emerged to deal with the variety of initial conditions.

In some cases

the government levied labor taxes or poll taxes to stimulate an exodus from
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the "traditional" economy into the "commercial" economy.

In other cases,

the government seized the land or created a landlord class thus reducing
the opportunity cost of wage labor.

The fostering of a proletariat for

the export sector (including the food surplus to feed it) was also stimu
lated through land concentration, intensification of tenure arrangements,
and the growth of indebtedness.

National and international mobility was

encouraged as the government helped in recruitment and enforcement of con
tracts thus making possible vast transferences of population within con
tinents as well as from Asia to Africa and America.

In this way, labor and

exports were generated in each colony.
The gains from trade generated during Mercantilism II were shared un
evenly.

Initially, there was a decline (sometimes drastic) in the stan

dard of living for many people as they were coerced into export production.
Through time, this decline tended to be reversed as new opportunities were
made available in the commercial economy.

Increased specialization led to

new divisions of labor and created new dependencies as resources were real
located from the traditional economy to export production and the personal
ized society of the village was fragmented.

The striking feature of Merc

;mtilism II, however, is that the standard of living for the vast majority
of the population of Africa, Asia, and America rose very slowly in sharp
contrast to the progress at the center.
Although exact statistics are not available, evidence suggests that the
real wage for unskilled labor has risen slowly over the last 50 to 100
years, and this wage can be taken as a proxy for the level of income of per
haps two-thirds of the population.

Moreover, other evidence suggests that

debt peonage and tenure arrangements increased in the agrarian sector as
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peasants found themselve s increasin gly bound to money lenders and absentee
landowner s.

No doubt there was some improvem ent in consumpti on patterns as

superior European manufactu res increasin gly replaced native rural industry.
HOwever, the displacem ent of rural industry and tradition al activitie s also
led to the fragmenta tion of the agrarian society, and in many countries ,
especiall y those in which export specializ ation proceeded most rapidly, there
was a serious dete1:iora tion of the social life of the society.

12

The gains fro~ trade were partly captured by local elites (some of whom
were foreigner s fro~11 the mother country) who accumulat ed land, capital, edu
cation, or the rights to higher-pa ying employmen t in the governmen t bureau
cracy or in the commercia l economy.

Often an alien complex of productio n

was establish ed where the peasant cultivate d the soil or worked in the mines,
a foreign me::-ca.ntile class grew in strength (in Asia, Chinese, and in Africa,
Indian), and r.he Europeans controlle d the import-ex port trade as well as
determine d colonial expenditu re and labor policies.

The distribut ion of in

come refle=tcd the political power of this economic structure .

Much of the

gains from export g:7owth went to the governmen t (in the form of increased
revenues) , to the urba_n centers (where services and industry grew based on
export growth), and to local and foreign elites of one type of another.
In part, the gains were passed abroad in the form of lower prices.

The

division between the metropole and the local elite depended largely on the
propensit ies to :i.mport.

If surplus receivers had a much higher propensit y

to import thc:n the populatio n as a whole, the "cheap labor" policies followed
would be export bi?.sed to the benefit of the mother country.

On the other

hand, if local elites spent a high proportio n of their income on local
services, they w:::u1d divert labor from export productio n.

This would still
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involve an international transfer of surplus since a high proportion of this
elite income went to foreign settlers and colonial officials from the mother
country.

The surplus would, hO'tATever, tend to be consumed locally rather

than in the center.
This possible anti-trade bias was offset, at least in the initial phase
of colonialism, by a number of other policies designed to specifically en
courage exports.

Many labor policies directed labor towards particular in

dustries, e.g. mining, whose only function was production for exports.
Similarly, infrastructure was heavily biased towards export production and
neglected the production of home goods pr plaeed it at a disadvantage.

In

other words, the steps taken to produce cheap labor were combined with steps
taken to induce it to flow into exports.
The observed high elasticity of exports in this period thus reflects
government policy as well as market response.

A high export price resulting

from an expansion of demand would induce an increase in private investment
because of high profits.

It would also provide the government with extra

revenue (since trade taxes were the dominant source of funds) and thus lead
to the improvement of infrastructure and other support services which would
further stimulate international supply because of their export bias.

Thus

a strong tendency towards immizerizing growth was built into the system, for
any rise in price would trigger an expantion of export biased investment
until price fell sufficiently.
An alternative development strategy would have allocated a greater share

of public investment to home good industries and produced a more balanced
investment program.

This would have a substitution and an income effect.

The substitution effect of removing the export bias in infrastructure might
bias production away from exports but this might be offset by the income

7

effect from growth if importables were highly income elastic.

Moreover, the

development of the hinterland would have increased the variety of possible
exports and provided new opportunities for mutually beneficial trade.
A more forward looking policy would have directed a large flow of funds
from the center to the periphery for investment purposes.

The dominant fea

ture of Mercantilism II was the global capital market centered in London.
For the first time in history investment decisions throughout the world were
It

coordinated in one plaee and subjected to a single strategic conception.
thus became technically possible to spread capital evenly throughout the
world.

In other words, capital accumulation after 1870 could have proceeded

via capital widening rather than capital deepening, i.e., the capital labor
ratio could have remained constant and a far larger number of people ~ctiv
ated as industrial workers.

This would have soon exhausted the metropolitan

labor force and either capital would have had to move to the hinterland or
labor move to the center.

This, combined with efficient trade, would have

produced factor price equalization on a global basis.

In other words, had

this strategy been followed, industrial capitalism would have reproduced for
the entire world population the higher level of living it achieved for
Europeans.

(The term Europeans is used to include people of European descent

in all continents.)
The whole pattern of production and trade would have been quite differ
ent in such a system.

Manufacturing production would have spread through

out the world, earnings and output per worker employed would have been much
lower, but both the work and•its fruits would have been shared equally.

The

structure of manufacturing output would be altered towards the mass produc
tion of basic consumption needs rather than towards the high income goods
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that account for most of industria l output.

Instead of this, capital accumu

lation proceeded via capital deepening in the industria l countries and led to
a widening different ial in productio n and income between the center and the
hinterlan d.

Thus, the returns to labor were not equalized despite the great

expansion of trade after 1870 and large migration s of Europeans , Asians, and
Africans.
Capital per worker was raised and the expansion of the industria l labor
force slowed down.

This created a radically different structure of demand

from the egalitari an one just described , and led to an economy based on con
tinuous "creative destructi on" to use Schumpet er's phrase.

Because the cap

ital labor ratio increased steadily, the producer good sector had to contin
uously innovate labor saving machinery .

Raising per capita income for a small

favored group meant a continuou s change in the basket of goods consumed since,
according to Engel's law, people tend not to consume more of the same as they
get richer, but reallocat e their consumpti on patterns away from old goods
towards new goods.

Thus, towards the end of the 19th century, product innova

tion and marketing became the dominant problems of business enterpris e rather
than the mass productio n of goods.

Instead of applying the achieveme nts of

science widely and solving the basic problems of subsisten ce for the majority
of the world's populatio n, attention was focused on creating "new products"
and lightenin g the work load of the privilege d under the guise of technolog ical
change.
Why was the second path chosen rather than the first?

It could have been

due to the exogenous factor of technolog ical change or differenc es in productio n
functions , as many economic models imply, but we would argue that political
factors were an important if not dominant determina nt.

In our view, the ob-

-
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served uneven development represented uneven power and the resulting distribu
tion of income and demand was a social phenomenon rather than a technical one.
The control device was government expenditure.

Private capital was high

ly mobile during this period and flowed to wherever profit could be made.

But

the rate of profit or the demand for investment in any country depended upon
the extent of public investment in infrastructure and human capital.

The

colonial system centralized power over government expenditure policy and in
sured a much higher rate of public capital formation in the center than in the
hinterland.

This biased distribution of public capital provided "external

economies" in the center and directed private industrial capital away from the
hinterland
That this policy neither maximized world income nor distributed it equally
is not surprising.

The imperial system did not weigh people equally in its

social welfare function.

Political power was used to foster the growth of the

capital of the mother country-(i.e., the capitalists), subject to the constraints
of class conflict.

Using Kindleberger's group behavior approach, we might

analyze the policy of this period in terms of the alliances and coalitions
formed between the following groups:
Center

Hinterland

Capital

Cl

c2

Land

Tl

T2

Labor

Ll

L2

Let us first examine trade between Europe and the areas of European set
tlement in America, Oceania and Africa.

According to the theory of the time,

colonization, i.e., the migration of Europeans to other continents, was a
method of expanding land and warding off the tendency for profits to fall be
cause of diminishing returns in agriculture.

The resulting pattern of inter-
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national trade initially involved the exchange of manufactures for raw mater
ials because of two important historical advantages associated with the mother
country:

(1) a large domestic market giving rise to internal and external

economies, (2) a strong caoitalist class (or stock of entrepreneurship). Through
time, the colony developed its own manufacturing sector (aided perhaps by
tariffs or other government instruments) as the internal market expanded and
as the indigenous capitalist class acquired the strength and resources to en
gage in industrial activity.

Two-way trade in manufactures could then begin

based on differences in comparative advantage and tastes.
As Kindleberger noted, the smooth working of this model would only take
place under specific political conditions.

Since trade would tend to reduce

rents, it could only occur where the resistance of landlords was weak.

In

England, where the industrial classes had reached a position of dominance,
this condition prevailed and free trade allowed the importation of wheat which
helped to complete the lig~idation of landlords as the most powerful economic
group in Britain. 13

But in Germany, the agricultural class was sufficiently

strong to stop this development from taking place.

Ironically, growth and de

velopment proceeded much more rapidly after 1870 in Germany than in the rest
of Europe, perhaps because of the balance struct between agricultural and in
dustrial classes.

The fusion of rye and steel created a powerful alliance

which could use the state's power to pursue a growth-oriented strategy.
In terms of the above framework, the major conflict was between T1 and T2 •
The politics of labor were relatively unimportant because it was not yet well
organized and, in any case, labor tended to benefit from the cheap wheat.

It

also could migrate to the hinterland when severely hurt at the center (see
Kindleberger' s discussion of Italy) .

•rhe conflict between

c1 and c 2 was also
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muted in the early stage because of the low degree of capitalist development in
America.
After 1870, this power structure changed drastically .

The landed classes

became unimportant as a separate interest group (in the center) because they
were destroyed or absorbed into industrial capital.

The English capitalist

class lost its hegemonic position as native bourgeoisie s arose on the contin
ent, in A.merica, and in Japan.

Rivalry between C's became a dominant element

in the foundation of Mercantilism II.
Equally important, labor became a powerful force as it became concentrate d
in industrial centers.

The class-consc iousness was accentuated in England be

cause of the shock of the great transformat ion out of agriculture and into
the city as a consequence of wheat imports.
The result of these changes was that the Imperial centers were in no posi
tion to embark on a "big push" in the hinterland.

Their main concerns were to

ward off rivalry from competing centers, and to satisfy the growing demands of
labor.

Their policies tended to be defensive rather than offensive, mercantil

ist (i.e. protectioni st) rather than free trade, and ironically Edwardian Eng
land revived the paraphernal ia of the landed aristocracy it had just destroyed.
Many of the policies of Mercantilism II thus slowed down the rate of growth
and prevented the full development of the potential created by the scientific
revolution.

The fact is masked by growth statistics which show what happened

instead of what could have happened.

Unlike Mercantilism I, where the dead

weight losses exceeded the gains, technologic al achievement s of the 19th century
were so great as to overwhelm the inefficienc ies and retarding elements of Mer
cantilism II.

l
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Instead of promoting the growth of enterprise in the hinterland, colonial
policy arrested the development of native capitalists by failing to provide
positive incentives and by the application of negative measures including, in
some cases, outright destruction of burgeoning enterpreneurship.

For similar

reasons, they preferred low wage/low productivity labor in the hinterland over
high wage/high productivity workers because the latter would have been a poten
tial political threat.

The dual of this policy was to create a labor aris-toc

racy in the center and to protect it through tariffs and immigration policy.
Education programs and expenditures were unequal being biased towards labor in
the center.

The two parts of the labor force must be seen as one if this per

iod is to be analyzed properly.
Finally, the center had to devote an increased share of government activity
to military and other non·-productive expenditures and had to rely frequently in
the hinterland on an alliance with an inefficient class of landlords, officials,
and soldiers, to maintain stability at the cost of development.

A great part

of the surplus extracted from the population was thus wasted locally.
The ideology of Mercantilism II, as reflected in economic theory, was
capitalism triumphant.

By the early twentieth century, nearly all of the com

ponents needed to solve mankind's material problems had been discovered.

The

only task left was the systems analysis problem of organizing and applying
them.

Mercantilism II began with great promise but after a brief time-span

became seriously troubled and increasingly characterized by War, Depression,
the Breakdown of the International Economy, and War again, rather than by Free
Trade, Pax Brittanica, and Material Improvement.
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Mercantilism III
Political change, i.e., national independence, is clearly at the heart of
the policy changes that ushered in Mercantilism III.

The depression and World

War II weakened the center allowing the national bourgeois class (C 2 ), born in
the colonial export economy, to assert independence and to divert government
expenditures to their own ends.

Their control was, however, far from complete

and the restrictions and biases of the international economic system governed
much of their actions.

They did not, for example, face perfectly competitive

markets in which they could trade freely with other countries.

Instead, they

frequently encountered large oligopolistic corporations with whom they had to
bargain for needed investment goods and technology.

Moreover, the governments

in the advanced countries, though no longer possessing legal control, contin
ued to exert pressure to keep the hinterland open to capital and manufactured
goods from the center.

Finally, the tariff structure used by the center effect

ively closed the rich industrial markets to manufacturing exports from the hin
terland.
The set of policy options open to the newly independent countries were
thus severely restricted (especially with respect to their control over the ex
port staples and the accompanying network of financial intermediaries) while
their targets and search procedures reflected and were limited by their dis
advantaged past.

The national bourgeois were, in effect, middlemen who did

not understand the wider system above them and who could not mobilize the peo
ple below them.

Given the limited vantage point of their past, they became

imitators rather than innovators; they were children of the Europeans, an under
developed middle class.

Forced industrialization became their strategy and the

goal was to create a national capitalist class by using protection and import-
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substitut ion policies.

The result was uneven developme nt.

Although there seems to be a variety of experienc es in the post-war period,
as each country endeavore d to formulate a national policy peculiar to its cir
cumstance s, a common theme is found in the tendency to reproduce on a national
scale the pattern of the internati onal economy evolved during Mercantil ism I
and II.

Capital formation is concentra ted in urban centers resulting in rising

capital labor ratios, productiv ity, and per capita income for a small group of
people.

The neglect of the agrarian sector leads to rural stagnatio n and an

unlimited supply of labor at low wages.

An income and class gap emerges

parallel to the internati onal gap between European and non-Europ ean previousl y
c:Jescribed .
Basically , the import substitut ion policies result in a rapid growth of
manufactu ring centered in urban areas with little generatio n of employme nt.

The

economic reasons usually given are the labor-sav ing nature of foreign technolog y
coupled with :i.mperfe.::tior:s in the factor market which cause the imported price
of capital to be too low and lead to a steady increase in the organized manu
facturing sector's capital labor ratio.
Although we cannot analyze this system in detail here, we do want to point
out, in the spirit of thi.s paper, that the reasons behind this scenario lie as
much in the "power" equations as the market equations .

The biases in economic

structure come from the governme nts' attempt to favor one sector over another.
The devices used to protect the national capitalis t class have long been studied
by trade eco:!:Jmi:::ts, i.e., the instrumen ts of tariffs, quotas, exchange controls,
import-li censing, and internal subsidies .

Less fully analyzed, but equally im

portant, are the bi.ases in governmen t infrastru cture towards urban industria l
needs, the establ~.shmf':nt of a discrimin atory education al system, and the use of

-
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the police-power of the state to suppress the rural population and maintain
the surplus of labor at the existing wage.

It is these policies and the in

volved political relationships, and not merely the shape of production func
tions, that help to explain the output mix, factor proportions, and factor
prices observed.

The symbiosis between the national bourgeois and the state

favored capital and a select group of urban labor at the expense of the pop
ulation as a whole, and this resulted in a rapid growth of manufacturing, an
increase in industrial wages rather than employment, and an excess demand for
jobs.

It also resulted in an output mix aimed at the few, emphasizing import

substitution rather than import displacement. 14

In other words, the "inde

pendence" strategy accepted foreign tastes and foreign technology and tried
to reproduce them on a miniature basis instead of adapting to local needs and
local endowments.
There is reason to believe that this strategy is reaching a turning.
point as it encounters increased imbalance in the labor market and the for
eign exchange market.

A new solution is threrfore needed to deal with the

crisis in population, employment and balance of payments which result from
growing political pressure from the excluded population and the international
economy.

The basis for it seems to be an alliance between

native capitalist class and the Multinational Corporation.

c 2 and c1 , the
This new group

behavior, if it continues to develop, will lead to new economic configurations
and a new international division of labor.

We cannot analyze it in detail

here but we might conclude the essay with a few conjectures about the next
round of Mercantilism III.
We argued that Mercantilism I led to the formation of c 1 , while Mercantil
ism II broke down, in large part, because of rivalries between subgroups of Cl'

~
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i.e:, the various national capitals of the center.· In the first round of
Mercantilism III, c 2 succeeded in establishing itself as a minor partner
secure but in no way powerful enough to challenge or replace c 1 •

Meanwhile,

a new relationship has appeared within c 1 in the form of a growing trend
towards rnultinationalization of private enterprise.

Mergers and foreign in

vestment by American and European firms are leading to interpenetration of
markets and the weakening of links between particular countries and particu
lar firms. 15
Thus the stage is set for a new international industrial structure dom
inated by 300 to 500 large North Atlantic oligopolistic corporations which
operate on a global basis in cooperation with smaller national firms who
serve as suppliers, distributorsv licensees, and in some ways, as competitors.
The trade pattern associated with this international hierarchy of decision
making will lead to an exchange of goods and services based on skill differ.-·
entials.

The center will specialize in complex manufacture and high-level

technology, i.e., systems designv research, marketing, finance, while the
hinterland will specialize in labor-intensive production.

The multinational

corporation, if it succeeds, will reproduce on a world-level the centraliza
tion of control found in its internal administrative structure.
Three major political questions dominate any attempt to predict the
future course of the international economy.

First, will there be some sort

of alliance of L's to match the alliance of C's?

Second, will multinational

corporations be able to construct multinational political institutions to
replace the nation-states whose power they are eroding?

Third, will it be

possible to resolve rivalry between the capitalist and socialist block and
within the capitalist block itself (e.g., the problem of Japan and Germany)?
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The progression from Mercantilism I to Mercantilism II to Mercantilism III
has seen an increased complexity of political and economic linkages between
countries.

Modern communications and the multinational corporations are in

creasing inter-connected ness to so great an extent that a qualitatively new
system is emerging.

The greater the interactions between countries, the

greater the interdependence , i.e., the higher are international multipliers,
the lower are national multipliers.

If we.were dealing purely with market

relationships, this would not be a troublesome factor, since a great deal is
known by economists about the self-regulating properties of general equilibrium
systems involving many decision units.

These stability propertic~ do not hold

on the political plane where tariff struggles and "beggar rr,y neighbor" policies,
etc., lead away from pareto optimality.

International trade theory, because it

does not include these political factors, is misleading and costly in analyz
ing the current world economy.
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